NANJING ECHO:
ILLUSION, SUBTERFUGE AND PUBLIC RELATIONS
IN THE
‘RAPE OF NANKING' DEBATE

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November 17, 2017
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Introduction

December 13, 2017 marks the 80th Anniversary of the Japanese Imperial Army’s seizure of Nanjing, then capital of Nationalist China. What occurred next, with alleged weeks of mass executions, rapes, torture, looting and arson, is steeped in controversy and poisons relations between China, Japan and their peoples to this day.

This year is also the 20th Anniversary of Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997) (“The Rape of Nanking”). Weaving contemporaneous letters and diaries, government intelligence reports, war crime investigations and testimony with modern oral history, *The Rape of Nanking* was a, if not the *J’accuse …!* of the 20th Century. *The Rape of Nanking* arrived at a time when events at Nanjing had largely been forgotten in the English language West. That could no longer be said after the book’s appearance. Chang’s book achieved remarkable sales and was showered with praise from leading academic historians and others. Chang herself, a mere 29 years of age when the book was published, was feted at book signings and other public events.

But a reaction soon set in. Along with the praise, both Chang and her book were also savaged with criticism and not just in Japan, where her passionate critique of Japanese behavior sparked outrage. Circles within the Western academic community began publishing strident criticisms. These criticisms were repeated and amplified for years. Precisely because they issued from respected historians, the drumbeat has taken a toll on the reputation of book and author. They likely account for the eventual reputation for error and poor quality that appears to have taken hold within portions of the ‘Academy.’

As it turns out, a concealed hand was involved in much of the criticism’s torrent - Japan’s Foreign Ministry. While undisclosed until now, the Foreign Ministry financed and promoted a ‘public relations’ campaign aimed at discrediting and vilifying Chang and her book. This campaign ran ten years, beginning shortly after publication of Chang’s book and continuing four years after her death in 2004, culminating during the 70th Anniversary of Nanjing’s occupation. Principal weapons used in this campaign included the writings of internationally renowned historians Joshua Fogel, Hata Ikuhiko and Alvin Coox. The Ministry’s public relations apparatus advertised these writings as modern, objective and scientific. The reality is far different. Instead, through consistent exaggeration, error and misquoting, these writings fashion a fictionalized and stereotyped version of Chang and *The Rape of Nanking*. As such, they distort public and academic understanding of this most disputed of historical events.

The Camouflaged Hand of the Japanese Foreign Ministry

and *The Rape of Nanking.* *Japan Echo*'s December 2007 issue coincided with the 70th Anniversary of the actual Rape of Nanking/Nanjing Incident.¹ *Japan Echo* republished all its Nanjing articles, plus two new ones, in a book commemorating the 70th Anniversary titled *An Overview of the Nanjing Debate* (Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc., 2008) (“*Nanjing Debate*”).

*Nanjing Debate*’s announced aim rejected a ‘balanced’ sampling of the full range of views regarding Nanjing on the ground that this would mean introducing ‘political viewpoints that are based on evidence of questionable authority.’² Rather, the promised goal was to present conclusions of historical research about Nanjing that are ‘in compliance with modern, scientific standards.’ Later advertising described *Nanjing Debate* as seeking to present a ‘more objective, scientific approach to this important historical issue.’³

While unrevealed in *Nanjing Debate* and the relevant three *Japan Echo* issues, the periodical was founded, funded and distributed by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of its ‘public relations’ responsibilities. In April 1974, the Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Overseas Public Relations Division, Hasegawa Kazutoshi, asked a Tokyo academician, Seki Yoshihiko, to take charge of a new quarterly journal that would present English translations of articles from Japan’s major monthlies. A private corporation, Japan Echo, Inc., was set up as the periodical’s publisher. The Foreign Ministry provided funding for its self-described ‘foreign language PR publication’ in the form of appropriations renewed annually without competitive bidding and distributed copies to ‘intellectuals overseas,’ including scholars, university libraries, media organs, and research institutes. As of 2010, the Foreign Ministry was purchasing and distributing 50,000 copies of *Japan Echo* each year. Sister periodicals were also published in French, Spanish, Korean, Chinese and Arabic.

Without this backing, *Japan Echo* could not have continued in business and when the Japanese Government cut funding in early 2010, *Japan Echo* promptly folded.⁴

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¹ *Japan Echo*, December 2007, 4. Controversies extend to what to call the events in Nanjing, e.g. massacre, atrocity, incident, disorder, or even just ‘confusion.’ This paper will simply refer to ‘Nanjing,’ with apologies to all who prefer otherwise.

² *Nanjing Debate*, 6 and back cover.

³ This advertising was featured on back interior covers of *Japan Echo* issues from June 2008 to April 2009 and front interior covers from June 2009 to April 2010.

⁴ In June 2010, the Foreign Ministry ended the subterfuge when *Japan Echo* was reformulated as *Japan Echo Web.* Japan’s Foreign Ministry was henceforth identified as publisher. *Japan Echo Web* was replaced by *Japan Foreign Policy Forum* in November 2012.
These facts are known because of the reaction of Japan Echo’s Editor and Publisher when the Foreign Ministry’s money was cut off - they ‘outed’ the truth in the Editor’s “Japan Echo Gets the Ax” article and a “Letter from the Publisher” in the final April 2010 issue.5

Had the Foreign Ministry’s involvement been noted within the pages of Nanjing Debate and relevant Japan Echo issues, readers would have been instantly alerted for possible bias. The disclosure would have sharpened the focus on the vast discrepancy between the promised objective, scientific history and what was delivered, assuming all the contributors would have been willing to have their work appear in a disclosed Foreign Ministry publication.6 But it was not.

“Modern, Objective, Scientific Historiography”

The promise of a modern, objective and scientific approach is not just publisher’s puffery. Professor David Askew develops it much further in one of Japan Echo’s 70th Anniversary articles.7 Askew, a professor at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University in Japan, refers to Chinese researchers and writers on Nanjing as ‘corpse maximizers’ who are straight-jacketed by their government. In Japan, the debate is conducted as a daggers drawn duel between ‘great massacre’ and ‘illusionist’ schools, the latter presenting Nanjing as a global fantasy - fake news. Askew writes that these competing ‘schools’ are highly politicized (he prefers to denominate them ‘leftist’ and ‘rightist’) and create ‘mythological narratives’ based less on fact than ‘imaginary conceits’ and ‘wishful thinking.’

According to Askew’s “Specter,” hope lies only in the middle, with ‘truly objective historians’ who ‘take a calm, objective, and impartial approach,’ who produce works ‘advancing (a) middle-of-the road view of the atrocities,’ who critically examine the work of ‘myth-makers’ and instead craft a history ‘dispassionately and objectively on the basis of empirical historiography.’ Members of this ‘academic research school,’ he says, do not arbitrarily construct views of the past and reject name-calling.

5 Japan Echo, April 2010, 2-4, 68. The October 2006 Japan Echo, which did not include Nanjing articles, contained an obituary for Seki Yoshihiko. This included references to Hasegawa Kazutoshi’s role in establishing Japan Echo. There was no such disclosure, however, where it mattered the most - Nanjing Debate and the three relevant issues of Japan Echo.

6 Japan Echo’s Editor took the position that ‘in order to keep the magazine from being government propaganda, though the views of the Foreign Ministry are to be considered, the Editor in Chief is to have final say over editorial content.’ The Foreign Ministry obviously had a money cudgel if needed and the anti-Chang campaign covered a decade in which the Ministry could have intervened if discontented. This paper, however, will follow Japan Echo’s characterization of itself as public relations, not government propaganda.

Elsewhere, Askew warns against use of ‘violent and inflammatory language,’ This standard is particularly worthy, since by 2007 ‘venom’ between Chinese and Japanese over Nanjing was at a ‘peak level.’

*Japan Echo*’s advertising and Askew’s “Specter” offers beguiling hope for answers to the tormented history of Nanjing. The reality is as different as day from night.

**Joshua Fogel and “Controversy”**

Askew’s “Specter” praises Joshua Fogel as an exemplar of the moderate academic school and one who avoids ‘pointless mud-slinging with their ideological enemies.’ Elsewhere, Askew has described Fogel’s Nanjing work as ‘especially sophisticated.’ Since Askew has been Fogel’s associate regarding Nanjing since at least 2002, there is little chance he was not closely familiar with exactly how Fogel approaches Iris Chang and *The Rape of Nanking*.

Fogel’s contribution to *Nanjing Debate* is “The Controversy over Iris Chang’s *Rape of Nanking*” (“Controversy”), which appeared in *Japan Echo*’s February 2000 issue. Fogel’s article was not originally written for a Japanese audience, suggesting it may have been especially commissioned for *Japan Echo*. At the time, Fogel was Professor of History at The University of California, Santa Barbara. Fogel is a prolific and respected scholar of Chinese and Japanese

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9 *The Nanjing Atrocity 1937-38: Complicating the Picture*, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 3 (‘.there is no fruitful or even civil dialogue about [Nanjing] between Chinese and Japanese; indeed, venom now flows at peak levels’ per Wakabayashi).

10 *Nanjing Debate*, 31, 34.


13 *Nanjing Debate*, 100-07.


history and a major translator of Chinese and Japanese historical works. The breadth of his knowledge within his fields of expertise is remarkable.\textsuperscript{16} His academic works show a scholar more than capable of carrying out the promised calm, moderate and objective analysis.\textsuperscript{17}

Fogel’s “Controversy” is nothing of the sort. From beginning to end, its hallmarks are vitriol and outrage. Fogel condemns Chang’s ‘most irritating quirk” and her ‘most offensive argument.’ He judges that ‘she should be ashamed of herself.’ She is not just wrong, ‘but perversely so.’ Chang’s ‘evidence is paltry,’ and one of her major claims is ‘patently false’ and another ‘ludicrous.’ She is ‘slanderous.’ She is ‘crude and dissembling.’ He compares Chang’s book to the ‘bizarre conspiracy theories’ and ‘weird rendition’ of Oliver Stone’s movie \textit{JFK}.

These denunciations are of a piece with a long line of Fogel writings regarding Chang which appeared in the privileged platforms of professional academic journals. In 1998, he proclaimed that ‘had a white person written this chapter, I can imagine screams of racism ringing through the halls of academe.’ He complained that ‘Chang knows…but remains deaf,’ she is ‘unnecessarily unnuanced and, indeed, inaccurate and unfair,’ and her book is not only ‘full of misinformation,’ but of ‘harebrained explanations.’ She does not just make mistakes, but tells ‘whoppers.’\textsuperscript{18} In 1999, he decried the ‘outrageous misinformation appearing in…Chang’s best selling Rape of Nanking.’\textsuperscript{19}

In 2001, he condemned Chang and ‘others of her ilk.’\textsuperscript{20} In 2007, he referred to the ‘likes of Iris Chang,’ who ‘knew next to nothing about’ Japanese opinions, and who participated in a ‘neurosis of remembering.’\textsuperscript{21}

While pouring fuel on the debate’s fire at the aforementioned time of peak venom, Fogel’s “Controversy” is also frequently and materially wrong, often wildly so. A stark example concerns death threats leveled at writers and researchers on Nanjing. Fogel accuses Chang of ‘an astounding level of ignorance,’ when she writes that research on Nanjing in Japan can be career


\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Journal of Asian Studies} 57, no. 3 (August 1998): 818-820.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Monumenta Nipponica} 54, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 543-546.


or even life threatening. He introduces this section by accusing Chang of acting ‘perversely’ in ‘making obvious claims contrary to what is observable and verifiable.’ Yet, his “Controversy” was republished at a time when evidence not only showed that Chang was correct, but it included evidence bearing Fogel’s own historiographic fingerprints.

In 2000, historian Takashi Yoshida stated that the Japanese ‘revisionists’ who believe Nanjing was a fabrication ‘risked their professional careers and even their lives,’ and receive ‘threatening messages, including death threats’ when they speak out. This disclosure occurred in the book which Professor Fogel edited for the University of California Press.

In 2007, Fogel’s then colleague at York University, Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, writing in Complicating the Picture, disclosed that:

‘Ultranationalist thugs deny any moral wrongdoing on Japan’s part and they issues threats of death or violent confrontation to silence anyone who says otherwise. Some of the authors in this volume have received such threats in the mail, over the phone, or in person at public lectures.’

In that book’s Preface, Professor Wakabayashi thanked Fogel who had ‘commented on drafts’ of the very chapter in which the death threats were revealed.

Yet, Fogel’s ‘astounding level of ignorance’ claim was soon republished in Nanjing Debate and remains unmodified to this date.

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23 The Nanjing Debate in History and Historiography, 117.

24 Complicating the Picture, 10. Since a substantial part of Wakabayashi’s book was generated at a March 1999 conference, it is possible that the death threats occurred at least that far back. At a minimum, they were known before the book’s 2007 publication.

25 Ibid., x.

26 Chang also received hate mail, including an envelope containing two bullets. Ying-Ying Chang, The Woman Who Could Not Forget (New York: Pegasus Books 2011), 281-82.
On a related issue regarding frustrated efforts to secure a Japanese translation of *The Rape of Nanking*, “Controversy” dismisses Chang’s “unsubstantiated claims that the publishing house Kashiwa Shobo was bending under pressure from “right-wing Japanese organizations.”’ Yet, a November 11, 1998 e-mail from the publisher to Chang finds it explaining that:

‘As we have indicated before, our publishing company is subject to considerable attack and it’s not an exaggeration to say that we have put ourselves in a life-threatening situation in publishing this book.’

This section of the email was first published in the *New York Times* in May 1999, prior to the original publication of “Controversy” and it was more completely quoted in 2006, two years before “Controversy’s” unaltered republication.27

Other errors abound. Fogel’s “Controversy” indicts Chang for reducing ‘the entire history of Japan up to the point of the massacre….all to bushido leading to mass murder.’28 This is waved off with a single belittling argument, namely that ‘the fact that only a tiny fraction of the population was of the samurai class does not enter into [Chang’s] calculations.’ By this reasoning, the Manchus, who were not more than one percent of China’s population, could never have conquered the nation, yet they did.29

In truth, the very first chapter of *The Rape of Nanking* finds Chang considering exactly what Fogel says she ignored - that the ‘code of the samurai (was) initially followed by only a small percentage of the population….’30 And rather than reducing the ‘entire’ story to ‘bushido,’ she describes a whole series of events and conditions that led to the rise and dominance of Japanese militarism - gunboat diplomacy from the imperialist West, the sudden conversion to ‘modernity,’ successful military ventures and perceived failing diplomacy, economic depressions, the 1923 earthquake, overpopulation and under feeding, assassinations, attempted coups, and a

27 Takashi Yoshida, *The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China and the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), 173-176. While the e-mail also asserted the publisher’s determination to proceed in the face of these threats, they resulted in the publisher imposing humiliating conditions which eventually helped derailed the translation. These are discussed below in connection with Hata Ikuhiko’s claims on the matter. *Infra*, 18.

28 *Nanjing Debate*, 100-01.


30 *The Rape of Nanking*, 20.
regimented educational and religious system increasingly geared to exalt the Imperial military. Numerous respected writers, none of whom are accused like Chang of the racially suggestive ‘most irritating quirk…(of) psychologizing’ the Japanese,’ have worked these developments selectively or in combination.

“Controversy” ridicules the claim it ascribes to Chang that the Imperial Army developed a ‘master plan for the murder of tens of thousands of Chinese civilians and prisoners of war…when it realized it could not feed them,’ Fogel thunders that proof of such ‘mass butchery’ demands ‘the highest standards of historical analysis and scrutiny,’ but dismisses Chang’s proof as ‘paltry’ and based on a discredited source, David Bergamini. This relates to pages 40-46 of Chang’s book, which discusses mass POW killings. Chang’s sources, none of which Fogel contests, include the wartime diaries of Japanese soldiers, such as General Nakajima’s, head of the Army division occupying much of Nanjing. She quotes several Japanese journalists who were then in Nanjing. Hata Ikuhiko’s Nanjing Debate articles concede that 30,000 POWs were executed and another Nanjing Debate article explains that POWs were killed precisely ‘because they

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31 The Rape of Nanking, 19-33.


33 Nanjing Debate, 101-02.

34 The Rape of Nanking, 41 (‘There was a ruthless logic to the order. The captives could not be fed, so they had to be destroyed. Killing them would not only eliminate the food problem but diminish the possibility of retaliation. Moreover, dead enemies would not form up into guerrilla forces.’).

could not be fed.’ 36 Professor Wakabayashi made much the same point in 2007 in yet another article drafts of which Fogel reviewed before publication.37

As for Bergamini, author of the Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy (New York: William Morrow, 1971), Fogel’s zeal to link Chang to that controversial author causes him to miss her point completely. It relates to an alleged POW ‘kill order’ and Prince Asaka, Emperor Hirohito’s relative who arrived in Nanjing in time for the Army’s victory parade. Chang would have clearly preferred to lay the blame for the kill order at Asaka’s feet, as had been done the year before in the book The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs.38 To her credit, however, Chang advises that the evidence is more complicated than a simple ‘Asaka did it.’ Specifically, she cites Bergamini and another source for the proposition that Japanese Army officer Taisa Isamo (sic) bragged to another officer (Tanaka Ryukichi) that he had forged the kill order under Asaka’s seal.39 Chang is skeptical, warning that ‘we will never know if the story is true.’ She alerts readers that Bergamini’s book is poorly footnoted, but concedes that he may have actually interviewed Tanaka. Thus, her Bergamini reference here demonstrates intellectual honesty regarding the evidence, rather than a knee-jerk and clumsy lunging at an ideological enemy.

Fogel’s “Controversy” complains that ‘[t]he Chinese in [Chang’s] book are all depicted as victims, people without agency; the Japanese are depicted solely as aggressors,’ while she is curiously silent on the Chinese.’40 Yet, in attempting to explain why Nanjing fell so quickly and chaotically, Chang points a finger at Nationalist Chinese leadership and Chiang Kai-shek in particular for indecisively deciding to both defend and abandon Nanjing. After posting an ailing general (and former ‘deadly rival’ of Chiang) to defend the city, the Chinese air corps took off, leaving the defenders without strategic aerial data of Japanese movements; communications equipment was removed, meaning one part of the defending army could not talk to another; Chiang rejected a truce when it might have done some good for Nanjing and then, at the last moment, caused an unplanned retreat after ordering the defending general to abandon his troops. Chang writes ‘it was a decision that resulted in one of the worst disasters of Chinese history.’41

36 Nanjing Debate, 18-19, 120 (Hata’s 30,000 estimate) and 68 (Kitamura Minoru’s ‘they could not be fed.’).

37 Complicating the Picture, 373 (lack of food ‘…was the main pretext for killing Chinese troops who tried to surrender or, less justifiably, POWs already in custody.’). Regarding Fogel’s pre-publication review of drafts of that chapter (#16), see Ibid., x.

38 Young Shi, James Yin, Ron Dorfman, The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs (Chicago, IL: Innovative Publisher’s Group, 1997), 74-75.

39 The Rape of Nanking, 40, 236, n. 40. See also, Chang’s discussion of Hirohito. Ibid., 176-180.

40 Nanjing Debate, 102.

41 The Rape of Nanking, 67-79.
Nor are the Japanese portrayed as ‘solely the aggressor,’ as Fogel accuses. *The Rape of Nanking* depicts Japanese commanding officer Matsui Iwane’s attempt to prevent the worst excesses at Nanjing.\(^{42}\) Similarly, Chang discusses well-meaning, but fruitless attempts by Japanese diplomats to derail the nightmare.\(^{43}\) On this issue as elsewhere, *The Rape of Nanking* is far more nuanced and balanced than the crude caricature “Controversy” sketches.

“Controversy” bemoans that Chang’s book ‘plays right into the hands of the right-wing extremists in Japan’ who ‘have been using the numerous errors in Chang’s book to discredit all discussion of the Nanjing Massacre.’ What advantage and comfort might those that Fogel dismisses as extremists derive from his flat-footed statement that ‘…no serious scholar of modern Chinese or Japanese history accepts (The Rape of Nanking’s) findings’? The claim is certainly erroneous. Frederic Wakeman, a University of California (Berkeley) scholar whose plaudits include being called ‘quite simply the best modern Chinese historian in the last 30 years,’ opined:

> “Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking* is an utterly compelling book. …Many Japanese have denied that these events ever took place, substituting amnesia for guilt, but Iris Chang’s heartbreaking account will make such evasion impossible in the future for all but the most diehard right-wing Japanese extremists.”\(^{44}\)

Other historians with notably favorable reviews or comments include Rana Mitter (Oxford), Ross Terrell (Harvard), Beatrice Bartlett (Yale), Peter Li (Rutgers), Christian Klingenberg (Oxford), and Richard Rhodes. Even largely critical reviews were balanced with praise.\(^{45}\) Mark Eykholt, for example, credited ‘an admirable amount of research’ and an ‘extensive use of

\(^{42}\) *The Rape of Nanking*, 50-52, 174-175.


sources’ in Chang’s ‘vivid and highly readable’ account.\textsuperscript{46} As noted, Fogel accuses Chang of acting ‘perversely’ in ‘making obvious claims contrary to what is observable and verifiable.’

In spite of his blanket statement, Fogel acknowledges that favorable reviews were wide-spread, but writes them off as written by those ‘who should have known better,’ but ‘were simply afraid to say otherwise.’ Meanwhile, he treats his own review of \textit{The Rape of Nanking} in the \textit{Journal of Asian Studies} as practically a profile in courage.\textsuperscript{47} But critical praise was not limited to any gushing (or fear-stricken) phase immediately after publication of \textit{The Rape of Nanking}. In 2006, two years before Fogel’s “Controversy” was republished, Edward Drea, a respected historian on the Japanese Imperial Army, participated in an extensive, multi-party study of Japanese war crimes records held in the United States. Following this, Drea wrote that:

‘Chang’s moving testament to Chinese victims of the sack of Nanjing in 1937 graphically detailed \textit{the horror and scope} of the crime…’ (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{48}

Fogel next turns to Chang’s description of Nanjing as a forgotten holocaust, which he calls ‘her most offensive argument.’ He writes this is ‘pure emotionalism’ on the part of ‘Ms. Chang,’ which is the only time “Controversy” emphasizes her gender with a ‘Ms.’ For Fogel, the term ‘holocaust’ belongs to \textit{The Holocaust} - Hitler’s Jewish extermination campaign - and perhaps to other mass killings like the Armenians in 1915, the Roma by the Nazis and American Indians by European immigrants, but not to Nanjing and certainly not to Iris Chang.\textsuperscript{49} Since the issue is not one of legal standards and definitions, but of opinion and value judgment, few would deny that feelings and emotions have a legitimate role in the debate. But while some believe that the term ‘holocaust,’ forgotten or otherwise, should be left out of the debate, that is a far cry from saying that reasonable people cannot differ on the issue.

\textsuperscript{46} Mark Eykholt’s review is contained in \textit{China Review International} 6, no. 1, (Spring 1999): 70-73. See also David Kennedy, \textit{The Atlantic} 281.4 (April 1998): 110 (‘the evidence amounts to a crushing indictment of the Japanese army’s behavior’).

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Nanjing Debate}, 103 (‘I received numerous letters and e-mail messages from scholars and graduate students praising my review and the courage it took to write it, none of whom has the nerve to say so in public.’).


\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Complicating the Picture}, 275-276. In urging this difference, “Controversy,” emphasizes that ‘Jews were murdered en masse in countries in which they were a tiny minority’ whereas ‘the Chinese were always in the vast majority vis-a-vis the Japanese aggressors.’ Fogel’s criticism of Chang for engaging in ‘comparative victimology’ occurs six lines later. \textit{Nanjing Debate}, 103.
Iris Chang was neither the first or the last to use the word ‘holocaust’ in connection with Nanjing or the Sino-Japanese war, though she appears to be the first to be savaged for it. Madame Chiang Kai-shek referred to the Asian Holocaust in early 1938, as did the editors of a scholarly book in 1992.\(^{50}\) In 1974, Frank Dorn described Nanjing in terms as starkly vivid as Chang’s and referred to it as a ‘holocaust of brutality.’\(^{51}\) Unlike present-day historians, Dorn was actually in China during this period, where his job as U.S. military observer took him across thousands of miles on all sides of the battle lines. Dick Wilson added to its usage in 1982.\(^{52}\) Even a Japanese participant in the Nanjing brutalities urges the comparison.\(^{53}\) And the poet Auden, also in China in 1938, reacted with a terrible prescience with his poem \textit{Here War Is Simple}:

\begin{quote}
And maps can really not point to places
Where life is evil now:
Nanking. Dachau\(^{54}\)
\end{quote}

Sweeping away any suggestion, surely unintended, that Chang was callous to Jewish victims of The Holocaust is the fact that Ms. Chang spoke before a packed house at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in March 1998. There, the Director of the Museum’s Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, Paul Shapiro, declared:

\begin{quote}
“Her (Chang’s) work of memory and research and the work of this museum and its scholarly Center are very closely related, and that is as it should be.”\(^ {55}\)
\end{quote}


\(^{54}\) \textit{The Rape of Nanking}, xi. For Auden’s tour of China in 1938, see W.H. Auden & Christopher Isherwood, \textit{Journey to a War} (New York: Random House, 1939)

“Controversy” next turns to Chang’s discussion of a ‘second’ Rape of Nanjing - the alleged post-war denials in Japan. Fogel denounces ‘Chang’s ignorance of Japan’ and ‘her belief that Japanese textbooks ignore Japanese aggression in World War II and the Rape of Nanjing in particular.’ He argues that ‘Americans have been led to believe… that all Japanese textbooks have been edited to skip over the war years and whitewash Japan’s role in the war,’ that this is ‘ludicrous’ and that Chang ‘should be ashamed of herself for perpetuating such a myth.’

If this is what Americans believe, they did not get it from Chang’s book. None of the facts listed in Chang’s ‘textbook’ section are contested, nor are any of the authorities she footnotes. The Rape of Nanking outlines a three decade long litigation struggle of Japanese historian Ienega Saburo against an obdurate Ministry of Education over textbooks, helped by the backing of thousands of sympathetic Japanese followers. One outcome, as Chang reports it, was ‘a heightened awareness inside the ministry [of Education] that the Nanking massacre was something they could no longer ignore.’ (emphasis added) She adds an example of how textbook language was changed to prevent a ‘skipping over.’ Once again, Fogel’s “Controversy” paints a false version of what Chang actually wrote.

Why Fogel is so repeatedly wide of the mark is largely speculative, but “Controversy” evidences that ideological resentfulness plays a hand. In the middle of “Controversy,” Fogel complains that:

‘[u]nfortunately, identity politics in America has of late taken the comparative victimology approach - namely that if you and your group have a great massacre in your past, then you have a right to speak, and no one can deny you this right.’

Fogel enlarges on this unfortunate American ‘speaking out’ in his 2007 Complicating the Picture article, where he attempts to deflate Chang with a sweeping trifecta of profiling and stereotyping - racial, national and even generational - targeted at what he calls ‘Fourth Generation Chinese.’ He pronounces that ‘members of this generation have championed China’s status as a victim in order to compensate for the very insecurity produced by their lack of anything substantive on which to build an identity.’ Adding to this arch dismissal, Fogel continues:

56 Nanjing Debate, 106.

57 The Rape of Nanking, 205-09, 280-81 (notes).

58 One ‘before’ text summed up Nanking as ‘[t]he battle of Nanking was extremely severe. China has asked Japan to reflect regarding casualties on the part of the Chinese army and civilians.’ The ‘after’ passage was ‘…After Nanking fell, it was reported that the Japanese army killed and wounded many Chinese soldiers and civilians, thus drawing international criticism.’ The Rape of Nanking, 208.

59 Complicating the Picture, 272-273.
that ‘overseas Chinese…search for an identity in this the year of identity politics, they often find that they lack the tools to acquire one,’

- that they ‘lack positive materials with which to forge their identity,’ and

- ‘they also have no historical experience from which to form a meaningful identity.’

Meanwhile, Fogel’s “Controversy” indicts Iris Chang for ‘psychologizing’ the Japanese and engaging in ‘third-rate pop-psychology.’

What does Fogel get right? “Controversy’s” most persuasive point targets Chang's claim that '[s]ixty years later the Japanese as a nation are still trying to bury the victims of Nanking--not under the soil, as in 1937, but into historical oblivion.' (emphasis added).\(^60\) Fogel accuses Chang of a’crude and dissembling statement that does enormous disservice to the Japanese scholars who, for three decades, have been the leading scholars in the world in researching every aspect of the Japanese war in China.’ This, he writes, is 'slanderous' to boot. This language is over the top given that Fogel [ill-serves] those very Japanese scholars by denying the death threats under which they labored. Nevertheless, blanket condemnations of entire peoples (or generations) is a fraught path and reasonable readers may certainly reject Chang’s ‘as a nation’ accusation.

But Fogel’s ‘victory’ here throws a spotlight on the shadows concealing Japan’s Foreign Ministry. Much of the output of the Japanese scholars to whom Fogel refers has never been translated into English. Edward Drea, writing of the work of the U.S. Interagency Working Group (IWG) in reviewing and declassifying U.S. records relating to Japanese war crimes, noted:

> “…scholars and special interest groups in Japan have pursued the topic of Japanese war crimes with academic vigor, fervor, and commitment…. most of this work has had little impact in the West because it remains untranslated.”\(^61\)

Another Nanjing Debate article confirms Drea by decrying a pronounced ‘information gap,’ whereby only a ‘tiny percentage of Japanese writing on the subject have been published in Eng-

\(^{60}\) Nanjing Debate, 104.

\(^{61}\) Researching Japanese War Crimes, 5. (emphasis added)
lish translations…” Writing in 2012, historians Daquin Yang and Andrew Gordon wrote that the trend of translating Asian scholarly works into English ‘has all but stopped in recent decades.’

One of Foreign Ministry's founding standards for Japan Echo was to strengthen Japan's international public relations 'in a balanced manner.' While Japan Echo may have followed this standard on other subjects, it was ignored when it came to Nanjing. While Nanjing Debate expressly eschews a ‘balanced’ presentation of views on Nanjing, such a view could not be extracted from the pages of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s public relations magazine even if it were desired. Japan Echo never published them and the Japanese Foreign Ministry did not distribute and promote them.

Insofar as they exist in Nanjing Debate, these other vigorous Japanese scholars and writers of Nanjing are like a Greek chorus, but one that bound, gagged and held captive off-stage, serving only as a convenient foil to the play’s protagonist.

Hata Ikuhiko’s “Fact and Fable” and the “Great Massacre”

Hata Ikuhiko is another historian David Askew identifies as part of the objective academic research school. Hata has been called the ‘doyen’ of Japanese military historians. Based on English translations of his military writings, that appears to be no exaggeration. Hata is rou-

62 Nanjing Debate, 78. That article, “Closing the Japan-China Perception Gap,” outlines a two year effort of the Tokyo Foundation, described as a ‘think tank,’ to close the gaps. This consisted almost in its entirely of translating, distributing and conducting a promotional road show in the United States and Canada for the central work of Japan’s illusionist or rightist school - The Nanjing Massacre: Fact versus Fiction (Tokyo: Sekai Shuppan, Inc., 2005) by Higashinakano Shudo. Higashinakano once contended there were only 47 civilian deaths in Nanjing. The only other translated work was a master’s thesis from a ‘young scholar of the middle of the road school,’ which has not been located. None of the works of Japan’s ‘great massacre’ school made the cut. David Askew was a member of the Foundation’s ‘special research committee’ leading to this one-sided effort, as was Hata Ikuhiko. Nanjing Debate, 77-80.


64 Japan Echo, April 2010, 68.

65 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945 (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 2009), ix.

tinely quoted by Western military historians. These passages show a balanced, interesting and
careful scholar, though much of his historical writings remain sadly untranslated into English.

Hata’s own book on Nanjing was published in 1986 and contained a striking apology to
the Chinese people. In part, Hata said:

‘It is a brutal fact that Japan perpetrated aggression against China for over 10
years. we inflicted immense pain on the Chinese and caused them massive losses at
Nanking and elsewhere….There is no agreement on numbers, but it is indisputable
fact that the Japanese army committed huge massacres plus many other evils at Nanking.
I too wish to apologize to the Chinese people from the bottom of my heart.’

While working on his book, Hata wondered ‘whether there was something about dis-
cussing the events in Nanjing that robbed people of their rationality.’ Later, his approach to
Nanjing changed substantially and his articles in Nanjing Debate are from this later period.

Hata opens Nanjing Debate with the scene at a November 1997 Princeton University
Symposium on ‘The Nanking Atrocity,’ where he saw Chang at one of her first appearances. He
gave his presentation regarding numbers killed (his own estimate was 40,000), but in the ‘Q and
A’ session that followed ‘angry cries’ broke out against him when he listed one cause of the
atrocities as the city’s abandonment by the Nationalist commander. Writing about this incident
in December 2007, the event appears to have lingered with him. Joshua Fogel was apparently
also in attendance at this Conference and likely observed what occurred. Since the Princeton
Symposium was ‘student organized,’ it included some of the ‘Fourth Generation Chinese’ that
Fogel was fuming about a decade later.

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67 Unfortunately, Hata’s entire 1986 book has not been translated, but his apology is available in
Complicating the Picture, 388-389.

68 Nanjing Debate, 16.

1998’s Japan Echo); Hata, ‘Nanjing: Construction of a “Great Massacre,”’ Nanjing Debate, 8-22
(published in December 2007’s Japan Echo); Hata, ‘The “Illusion” and the “Great Massacre”
Schools, Nanjing Debate, 23-24 (same). The ‘Fact and Fable’ article is available on the internet
at China Political Links, https://sites.google.com/a/wellesley.edu/china-politics-links/a-japanese-

70 Nanjing Debate, 9-10.

71 Complicating the Picture, 274.

After this and ‘rowdy cat-callings’ at other academic conferences, Hata ‘changed his tune’ per Wakabayashi. Hata later attacks on Chang were strident, gender focused and error strewn. In “Fact and Fable” from Japan Echo’s August 1998 issue, he dismisses her book as ‘seriously flawed,’ which doesn’t surprise him given its ‘treatment of a major topic by a woman who reads neither Japanese nor German and who has no connections with any scholar of modern history capable of checking her work.’ (emphasis added). Luminaries including well-known university professors and Pulitzer-prize winning authors were ‘soft on Chang,’ per Hata, and swayed ‘by the force of her feminist rhetoric.’ Hata was not so outspoken at the Princeton Conference itself, explaining that he thought about asking Chang questions, but decided not to as ‘I feared I might get snapped at for “sexual harassment.”’

(As an aside, The Rape of Nanking was not presented as a feminist tract. Chang did not write ‘I am woman, hear me roar.’ She wrote as a human being who roared, and effectively so at that. It is Hata that injects ‘feminism’ into the dispute. As such, it reflects upon his attitudes in the matter. Those attitudes are even more glaringly on display in connection with the ‘comfort women’ issue, which Japan’s Foreign Ministry now admits involved ‘sexual slavery.’)

Complicating the Picture, 388-389 (‘More tragically, such tirades make enemies out of many Japanese who once expressed contrition about their war of aggression and remorse for its Chinese victims’ per Wakabayashi).


Nanjing Debate, 131.

Hata labels the comfort women claims a ‘circus’ and offers the world this metaphor:

‘The comfort women issue is like a volcano. Serious eruptions occurred between 1991 and mid-1993. They seemed to subside after the Kono Statement (1993) and an infusion of “atonement money” by the Asian Women’s Fund. But the dormant volcano spewed magma again in 2000, when the Women’s International War Crimes tribunal, which pronounced Emperor Showa guilty took place; and in 2005…. The eruptions have continued intermittently since then.’


Re: the Foreign Ministry’s acknowledgment, see statement at a public lecture by the Japan’s Consul-General for Portland, Oregon at Portland State University on February 16, 2016.
Hata, along with Fogel and others in *Nanjing Debate*, have long promoted the notion that *The Rape of Nanking* is loaded with factual errors. The ‘illusionist/rightist’ scholars in Japan also advance this line, so that it partakes of a meme or trope. For example, illusionist doyen Higashinakano Shudo claims there are (1) chronological errors, (2) misspelled names, (3) inaccurate titles of Japanese officers and (4) incorrect explanations of military technology from the [Japanese] Tokugawa period. As the ‘middle of the road’ expert on Chang’s inaccuracies, how accurate is Hata himself?

Hata asserts that a Japanese translation of Chang’s book ‘never made it into print because of her refusal to allow the Japanese publisher to correct even the most straightforward factual errors in her text.’ This is factually incorrect. Writing in 2006, historian Takashi Yoshida disclosed that Chang herself proposed correcting 12 factual errors in the text of the Japanese edition and another 24 ‘suggested corrections’ could be ‘integrated seamlessly into the existing footnotes.’ The dispute was over ‘corrections’ with which Chang did not agree and, more critically, the demeaning form in which corrections were to be made. The publisher, at least swaying under what it called the ‘life-threatening situation in publishing this book,’ preferred to combine the translation with third party comments, such as by inserting brackets directly in the text.

How would Hata and the others in *Nanjing Debate* feel if a publisher wanted to insert third party brackets in their writings?

One bracket insertion belongs at page 15 of *Nanjing Debate*, where Hata minimizes a 1982 dispute over the rendition of Nanjing in Japanese textbooks by reducing it to an ‘alleged’ Japanese government attempt to replace the words ‘aggression’ and ‘invasion’ with ‘advance,’

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77 *The Making of the “Rape of Nanking,”* 146.

78 *Nanjing Debate*, 11 (Hata’s 2007 article).

79 *The Making of the “Rape of Nanking,”* 174-175. At pages 233-34, Yoshida lists three proposed changes to ‘provide some sense of the nature of the publisher’s concerns.’ The examples are far from compelling, which appears to be Yoshida’s intent in listing them. Chang’s reference to Mussolini’s 1935 invasion of ‘Abyssinia,’ the commonly used name when the invasion took place, was proposed to be changed to ‘Ethiopia.’ Yet, ‘Abyssinia’ was still being used by a serious historian in 2007 when speaking of the invasion. *Complicating the Picture*, 10 (Wakabayashi). Second, Chang’s description of Perry sending two gunboats belching black smoke into Tokyo Bay during the U.S.’s 1853 intimidation effort was to be changed to four smoke belching gunboats. Lastly, it was charged that Japanese ultra-nationalists had not backed the 1894 Korean peasants’ uprising that led to the first Sino-Japanese War, though they apparently did exactly that. Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea 1868-1910* (Philadelphia: U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), 230-35, 414-15. Thus, Chang’s disagreement with some of the proposed ‘corrections’ does not seem unreasonable.
which allegedly came to light only because of ‘a reporter’s misleading coverage of the (textbook) 
authorization process.’ Takashi Yoshida demonstrates the utter shallowness of this description. 
Writing in the book which Fogel edited, Yoshida concludes ‘[i]t is undeniable, however, that the 
government tried to tone down the aggressive nature of the Asia-Pacific war in history 
textbooks,’ and cites five specific instances in which they were successful in doing so in 1982. 
Even Hata’s attempt to limit focus to just the words ‘invasion’ and ‘advance,’ a simplification 
shared by illusionist writers, was misplaced. Yoshida also describes Education ‘ministry de-
mands’ to substitute those very words dating to the mid-1950s.

More brackets are justified in the chart of ‘Errata from Iris Chang’s The Rape of Nanking’ 
contained in Hata’s 1998 “Fact and Fable” article. Fogel’s “Controversy” incorporates this 
chart by reference, saying that ‘virtually all of [Hata’s] points are well taken.’ Apart from the 
death numbers and photograph issues discussed below (Errata Nos. 12 and 13), Hata chose to 
write about only one on his list. Since this is also Errata No. 1 on his chart, it is presumably sig-
ificant. It concerns Cho Isamu, the Imperial Army officer who took credit for issuing an order to 
execute POWs under Prince Asaka’s seal. Hata makes no claim that Chang identified the 
wrong officer, that he didn’t so brag, or that he wasn’t there to do such dirty work and keep the 
hands of the ‘brass’ clean. But in calling him ‘Taisa Isamo,’ Chang got his name wrong. Hata ar-
gues she confused his first name with the Japanese word for ‘colonel’ - taisa - a ‘mistake nobody 
born and raised in Japan could possibly make.’ That is the sole substance of Errata No. 1.

This scarcely seems earthshaking and it’s not even clear that Hata correctly identified the 
source of Chang’s error. Cho was a mere Lt. Colonel at the time (chusa), not a Colonel (taisa), 
though Hata waves away that difficulty with his argument by claiming that the distinction was a 
‘trivial affair.’ Since ‘inaccurate titles of Japanese army officers’ is one of the categories of error 
asserted by Chang’s critics, perhaps some of those are trivial as well. Richard Storry, a respected 
historian of Japan, put the issue in context when he recommended another book even though it 
‘abounds in errors of a relatively unimportant kind, in the spelling, for example, of Japanese sur-
names.’ (emphasis added). Since ‘misspelled names’ are another category of Chang’s errors, 
perhaps some of those are also relatively unimportant.

80 The Nanjing Debate in History and Historiography, 85, 124. Yoshida’s own book adds more 
examples of the Education Ministry’s 1982 success in downwardly revising texts, specifically 
regarding Nanjing. The Making of the “Rape of Nanking,” 212-213.

81 Ibid., 92-93.

82 Nanjing Debate, 127.

83 The Rape of Nanking, 40.

84 Nanjing Debate, 141.

85 Richard Storry, The Double Patriots, 304. Storry discusses the outrageous Cho at 55, n. 4, 
where he notes confusion over Cho’s name.
Hata’s “Fact and Fable” article does not bother to discuss Errata Nos. 2-11. This omission is telling, as the majority are either wrong, unproven or immaterial, scarcely a passing grade and especially startling coming from a historian of Hata’s skills.86

Hata instead skips to Errata No. 12 - the debate over numbers of people killed and raped at Nanjing. Hata’s 1998 article is one of the few places where rapes are even mentioned in *Nanjing Debate.*87 Chang stated ‘[a]n estimated 20,000-80,000 Chinese women were raped.’88 Hata does not deny that such estimates have been made and he makes no effort to show they are wrong on either end. Nor does he deny that rapes occurred, nor give his own estimate, at least not in his English translated writings. So what is Chang’s ‘errata?’ Hata argues only that 20,000-80,000 is a ‘very rough set of statistics,’ which is true enough. He complains that when she was asked about what Hata describes as the ‘big gap’ between the two rape estimates in a television appearance, she explained that ‘the nature of events made it impossible to arrive at an exact figure,’ which also seems true enough.89 That Hata accuses Chang of factual error regarding rapes, after making no effort to show otherwise, reflects an incredibly cavalier attitude.

The other half of Hata’s Errata No. 12 concerns the front line of history’s war over Nanjing - the numbers killed. There are issues with every authority and every piece of evidence on the matter and almost all the issues have issues. Death toll estimators, then and now, speak to different geographic areas (the 40 square kilometer walled city, the ‘suburbs’ or the 8400 square kilometer Nanking Special Administrative District, which included 6 adjoining counties), different time periods (days, weeks, even months) and different categories of victims (soldiers, POWs, civilians and those in-between). One may reasonably elect simply to cite the judicial findings of post war trials for a conclusion, but this itself leaves a ‘big gap’ i.e., a range of 100,000 (the Matsui verdict), over 200,000 (the IMTFE umbrella judgment) and over 300,000 (the Nanking War According to his writer’s grading, Hata’s errata list scores a 27% for accuracy. See Appendix.

86 The same is true regarding the rest of the ‘parade of horribles’ described by Chang - looting, arson, torture, the plight of refugees, promotion of opium, medical experiments, etc - they are all but ignored in *Nanjing Debate,* save for a complaint that Chang ‘dredges’ them up. *Nanjing Debate,* 88 (Coox). The focus remains on death numbers. It is no small irony that another *Nanjing Debate* article, referring condescendingly to a reporter’s question about numbers, asserts ‘[t]o people without a deep knowledge of the historical process, numbers are the easiest thing to understand, offering what many imagine to be objectivity.’ *Ibid.,* 69 (Kitamura Minoru).

87 *The Rape of Nanking,* 6 and notes at 232.

88 Hata’s discussion is at *Nanjing Debate,* 127-28.
Crimes Trial). The fairness and competence of the trials themselves are at issue as well. Hata acknowledges that it is impossible to know the precise number right after criticizing Chang for making much the same point regarding rapes.

What did Chang say to support her opening statement that ‘the most conservative number’ was 260,000 and the ‘highest’ was 350,000? She quotes testimony of Miner Searle Bates, who was present in Nanjing, that ‘[t]he total spread of this killing was so extensive that no one can give a complete picture of it.’ This is perhaps given to explain away Bates’ own estimate of approximately 40,000, which Chang does not mention. She lists a range of estimates and seven estimators giving them, from 430,000 (‘Chinese military specialist’ Liu Fang-chu) to 3,000 (‘Some others in Japan…’). She includes John Rabe, head of the Nanking Safety Committee, at 50,000-60,000 and, to her credit, Hata’s 38,000-42,000. Chang describes in some detail the study of Jiangsu Academy of Social Sciences’ historian Sun Zhaiwei, who ‘calculated that the number of dead from the Rape of Nanking exceeded the figure of 227,400.’ She discusses the confession of a Japanese POW regarding burials and body dumping. Chang opines that ‘..the burial records at Nanking offer convincing evidence that the death toll was, at the very least, in the 200,000 range.’ She also refers to several other authors (Wu Tien-wei, James Yin and Shi Young), all with numbers surpassing 300,000.

Chang makes several overstatements. First, her own list of estimates shows that 260,000 is not the ‘most conservative number’ as she claims. Also incorrect is her claim that the Tokyo War Crimes tribunal (“IMTFE”) concluded that 260,000 people were killed during the Nanjing


91 Nanjing Debate, 18, 118-19.

92 Chang’s ‘death toll’ discussion occurs primarily at The Rape of Nanking, 4-6, 99-104.

93 Hata provides the reverse image of Chang’s use of Bates by quoting his estimate without the disclaimer he provided at the Tokyo War Crimes trial. Nanjing Debate, 121.

94 Askew opines that Sun Zhaiwei’s history is ‘relatively well-written.’ Ibid., 30.

95 The confession was provided by Ohta Hisao. One of Hata’s Errata (No. 7) asserts the confession was forced, though he offers no evidence of this. Chang acknowledges that ‘skeptics (may) dismiss Ohta’s confession as a lie…’, so at least the reader gets a ‘head’s up.’
Massacre, setting out a document from IMTFE records. The tribunal’s judgment instead ruled that ‘over 200,000’ civilians and prisoners of war were killed during six weeks. The 260,000 figure appeared on an IMTFE staff document summarizing burials. Chang herself more accurately described it on page four of her book as an estimate of ‘experts’ at the IMTFE, not the tribunal itself. She should have stuck with that. Indeed, she could have argued that the 260,000 document was an internal IMTFE record suggesting how much higher the ‘over’ in the judgment’s reference to ‘over 200,000’ might extend. At least then the issue would be limited to the evidence itself, not Chang’s use of it.

Third, Chang states that there is ‘compelling evidence that the Japanese themselves believed at the time of the massacre that the death toll at Nanking may have been as high as 300,000.’ (emphasis added). She refers to a relayed message from the Japanese Foreign Minister to Washington, D.C. on January 17, 1938. The document shows that the Foreign Ministry was on notice of the 300,000 claim, but it goes too far to stretch that to mean that it ‘believed’ it. Chang corrects herself in the paperback version of The Rape of Nanking, which added the following to the pertinent footnote:

‘Manchester Guardian correspondent H.J. Timperley originally wrote this report which was stopped by Japanese censors in Shanghai….His estimate of 300,000 deaths was later included in the message sent by Japanese Foreign Minister Hirota Koki to Washington, D.C. The significance of the message is that the Japanese government not only knew about the 300,000 figure given by Timperley but tried to suppress the information at the time.’ (emphasis added)

The fact that the Foreign Ministry was on notice at the time is itself a significant finding and it would not have hurt The Rape of Nanking to have gotten it right the first time.

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96 Her statement regarding the IMTFE tribunal’s determination occurs at page 100 (“more than 260,000 people were killed…”) and at page 102 (“approximately 260,000 people were killed…”). Her source is “Document no. 1702, box 134, IMTFE records, cited at The Rape of Nanking, 102, which she appears to have unearthed in her review of IMTFE archives.

97 The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, 71, 117.

98 Hata argues that the 260,000 estimate likely includes duplications. Nanjing Debate, 126.

99 The Rape of Nanking, 103-104.

In the end, Chang does not conclusively prove the range of deaths with which she opens the book, at least if one does not accept the war crimes trial’s verdicts as the debate’s end. Nor could she do so on such a complex issue in the ten or so pages she devotes to the issue. She does, however, show that there is a broad quantity of both contemporaneous and subsequent evidence, findings, studies and opinions suggesting one correct answer to the numbers question is ‘many.’

How does Hata compare? In his 2007 Japan Echo article (“Great Massacre”), he points to the 1939 book What War Means, compiled by Australian journalist H.J. Timperley, as source of the 300,000 death estimate. Hata complains that Timperley ‘accepted funding’ for his book from Nationalist China and was ‘an agent for the Nationalists,’ an ironic claim given Japan Echo’s concealed Foreign Ministry financing. Hata insists that its author Timperley had a ‘total lack of sources and evidence.’ Yet, in his next paragraph Hata attributes Timperley’s claim on 300,000 soldiers to a December 1937 report by Chiang Kai-shek after Nanjing’s fall and admits that number ‘is on a par with China’s annual casualty statistics’ provided to the IMTFE. He criticizes Timperley for ‘his choice to write that 300,000 soldiers and civilians were illegally killed, even though the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone reported this number was around 40,000.’ Yet in the next paragraph Hata correctly states that Timperley was writing about casualties for the entire central China campaign, not just Nanjing. Hata the accurate historian keeps getting in the way of Hata the argumentative polemicist.

Hata outlines his own calculations in his February 2000 Japan Echo article “The Nanking Atrocities: Fact and Fable,” though by 2007 he qualifies his original estimate of 38,000-42,000 ‘killed illegally’ to ‘a likelihood that the actual number lies well below this level.’ Indeed, he places ‘scare quotes’ in the title of his 2007 “Great Massacre” article, suggesting scorn or skepticism. Hata’s table of estimates from major sources is more extensive than Chang’s ranging from ‘very few’ to a million. Hata sets the time parameters of his estimate (six weeks after Nanking fell on December 13, 1937, the same used in the Tokyo trial) and geography (the walled city and adjacent suburban areas).

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101 In a further irony, the Summit Library System (USA) copy of What War Means consulted for this paper contains bold red ink stamps proclaiming it was ‘[p]urchased and [p]resented by The China Relief Fund Committee Singapore.’ Singapore was the center of Overseas Chinese support for anti-Japanese resistance at the time. These signs of an overseas distribution campaign gives the reader an alert for possible bias, in contrast to Japan Echo and Nanjing Debate.


103 Ibid., 110-123 (Hata calculations), 19 (Hata’s 2007 qualifier). Hata’s calculations are in turn taken from his 1986 book. Whether or not one agrees with his conclusions, both his language and analysis from 1986 are calm, careful and professional. The contrast with the later heated language and loose accusations in Nanjing Debate (not just Hata’s) is striking.
Hovering over Hata’s estimate is his focus on those ‘illegally’ killed. He emphasizes this four times in his 2007 *Japan Echo* article.\(^{104}\) He excludes those soldiers killed in combat, civilians killed the ‘crossfire’ or ‘illness’ and apparently executed soldiers who had discarded their uniforms (or never had them in the first place).\(^{105}\) How *any* of Japan’s killings in the entire Sino-Japanese war can be legal is not explained, but rather assumed. Having launched, as Hata and others admit, a war of ‘aggression’ and a ‘policy of plunder and pillage,’ how can any part of the Imperial Army’s violence in China be legal?\(^{106}\)

The ‘laws of war’ are unavailable to excuse the Japanese military’s killings because of the Japanese Imperial government’s own carefully considered decision. The Hague Convention of 1907, the ‘laws of war’ at the time, mandated either a declaration of war or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.\(^{107}\) The Japanese Imperial Government decided not to declare war in China because it considered the legal disadvantages (e.g., triggering an arms embargo under U.S. law) to outweigh the legal benefits and requirements.\(^{108}\) It thus remained the ‘China In-

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104 *Nanjing Debate*, 9, 18-19.

105 The latter is not completely clear. His 1998 article includes soldiers who were executed after being captured, but his 2007 article refers to Higashikano’s argument that Chinese soldiers who threw away their uniforms committed “…an illegal act under international law, and [their] killings could be interpreted as justifiable executions…” *Nanjing Debate*, 15, 112, 116. Hata separately criticizes others that fail to distinguish deaths attributable to atrocities and those that ‘merely happened to occur at the same time.’ *Ibid.*, 114.


107 Art. 1 of Convention III states ‘hostilities between the Contracting Powers *must not* commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.’(emphasis added). Art. 2 provides that ‘[t]he existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay…’ http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague03.asp (accessed January 16, 2017).

108 Tobe Ryoichi, “The Deepening Quagmire,” *Fifteen Lectures on Shown Japan*, ed., Kiyotada Tsutsui (Tokyo: Japanese Publishing Industry Foundation, 2016), 159-160. ("Accordingly, the Sino-Japanese War, until the Pacific War..., was not a "war" according to international law.”).
Having repudiated the legal burdens, the legal benefits of then existing ‘laws of war’ are unavailable to cloak the war dead. Imperial Japan’s right to kill anyone was \textit{void ab initio} by its own calculated decision.

The significance of this decision on the fate of Chinese captives was explained by Muto Akira, a key Imperial Army player in starting the war, pushing for Nanjing’s seizure and who rushed to Nanjing the day after it was taken. Testifying at his Tokyo war crimes trial, Muto stated:

‘...The question of whether Chinese captives would be declared prisoners of war or not was quite a problem, and it was finally decided in 1938 that because the Chinese conflict was officially known as an “incident” that Chinese captives would not be regarded as prisoners of war...’

Sticking to this story to the end, the Tokyo war crimes defendants argued that the ‘rules of war did not apply to hostilities in China and that consequently Chinese captives were not entitled to either the status or the rights of prisoners of war.’ The whole business of soldiers taking off their uniforms is thus irrelevant - the Imperial Army considered them all, uniformed or not, to be

\begin{footnotes}


110 For Muto’s role as a key proponent of launching the China war, see Mark Peattie, \textit{Ishiwara Kanji and Japan’s Confrontation with the West} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 267-310. For his role in urging Nanjing’s seizure, see Peter Harmsen, \textit{Nanjing 1937: Battle for a Doomed City} (Philadelphia PA: Casemate Publishers, 2015), 76-78.

111 Arnold Brackman, \textit{The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials} (New York: William Murrow, 1987), 174. Timothy Brook provides support for this, noting that the removal and execution of Chinese men at Nanjing was done ‘without much concern as to who was a soldier and who wasn’t.’ Timothy Brook, \textit{Documents on the Rape of Nanking} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 1999), 6.

112 Butow, \textit{Tojo and the Coming of the War}, 520. Butow also notes that no organization was set up to deal with Chinese prisoners until 1942, the same year the Army’s wars took a turn for the worse. \textit{Ibid.}, 514, n. 13.

\end{footnotes}
fair game according to a decision at the highest levels of Japan’s Imperial Government. Historian S.C.M Paine cites evidence that Japan held only 56 Chinese POWs at war’s end.

That aside, what Hata best accomplishes is to show the difficulty of the numbers debate. He considers and rejects, minimizes or proclaims issues with oral history, burial records, estimates of other Japanese historians, data sampling and population numbers. He sets as his main guide Japanese army field reports, which he notes were kept ‘as future reference for the granting of medals.’ These speak of ‘annihilation’ of remnants of the defeated army and ‘the execution of prisoners.’ Unfortunately, only 30% of the Nanking relevant field reports were located and Hata concedes that ‘[i]t is hard to reach a consensus on how the actions of the recorded battalions should be extrapolated to the battalions whose reports cannot be found.’ Hata’s findings are consistent with estimates that the Army destroyed 70% of its documents after the war was lost.

This document destruction spree is often overlooked by those who demand proof in written sources and Hata himself shows how relevant the purging was to survival of such evidence. Shockingly, a University of Tokyo historian claims in a book published at Harvard in 2012 that Japanese archives are still being destroyed.

Finally, without making the point directly, Hata shows just how much even so-called ‘moderate academicians’ are at loggerheads. David Askew, for example, says the Army field records, on which Hata relies, are accurate on things like ammunition expended and Japanese soldiers killed, but are ‘not reliable’ on other matters, including Chinese soldiers killed. Hata returns the favor by dismissing the Nanjing populations numbers, on which Askew fundamentally relies, because ‘it is probably not possible to come up with a reasonably accurate number because the inflows and outflows of people around this time was so great.’ Ibid., 120. Askew’s own

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113 Higashinkano proves at most that uniform shedders may have lost their status as POWs, but never shows this entitled the Army to gun them down. The Nanking Massacre: Fact and Fiction, 59-64, 78, 86, 125-146. The ‘Powers’ had attempted, but failed, to get language in the Hague Convention allowing the summary execution of guerrillas (franc-tireurs). At most Convention IV, Chapter II, Art. 9 of the 1907 Hague Convention allowed curtailment of ‘the advantages given to prisoners of their class,’ but this doesn’t link to any right summarily to kill. Even spies were entitled to a ‘previous trial’ before execution. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp (accessed January 16, 2017).


117 Nanjing Debate, 40.
estimate of ‘a low of 3400 to a high of 5000’ civilian deaths is contained in Complicating the Picture (p. 112), though it is not mentioned in Japan Echo or Nanjing Debate.

Similarly, while Hata emphasizes Rabe’s 50,000-60,000 estimate, historian Timothy Brook writes that it did not include executions of POWs and both Brook and Fogel note that Rabe did not have access to information of the killings beyond the city walls and out of the foreigners’ sight.118 A scholarly article in Complicating the Picture itself argues that ‘Chinese victimization was so much greater in the outlying region of the [Nanking Special Administrative District] than in the walled city itself.’119

Like Chang, Hata’s number count rest on uncertain ground, as his own caveats show. But, also like Chang, he shows that there is a broad quantity of evidence, findings, studies and opinions suggesting one correct answer to the numbers killed question is at least ‘many.’

While historians and others will likely forever debate the issue of numbers killed, there is one entity whose freedom to debate and deny would appear to be completely constrained - the postwar Government of Japan, including its Foreign Ministry. By the 1951 San Francisco Treaty restoring its sovereignty, Government of Japan bound itself to judgments of the Tokyo and other war crimes trials. Yet, during the decade of Japan Echo articles on Nanjing, those judgments were indeed challenged, albeit without disclosure of Japanese government’s behind the scenes role in financing and distribution.120

Hata ends his efforts with Errata No.13 - eleven ‘beheading and sexual crimes’ photographs used in Chang’s book. Hata admits that ‘[a]ll have appeared previously in various places and will not surprise experts on the subject, but they are sure to have a considerable impact on those seeing them for the first time.’ He claims that all eleven such photos are a combination of ‘fakes, forgeries and composites.’121 Rather than documenting his claim, he discusses

118 Documents on the Rape of Nanking, 14-15 (Brook). Complicating the Picture, 268 (Fogel).
119 Kasahara Tokushi, “Massacres Outside Nanking City,” Complicating the Picture, 68.
120 For the treaty see https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/Volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf. The acceptance agreement is contained in Article 11. However, the Foreign Ministry’s current website says this is binding on it in ‘state to state relationship(s).’ Whether this suggests the Ministry’s freedom on the subject when dealing with ‘non-state’ actors is not clear. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html#q8 (accessed January 29, 2017).
121 Nanjing Debate, 132.
only four and doesn’t try to prove any of those were forged. He claims one, showing severed heads lined up on the ground, were bandits executed in 1930, but offers no proof.

Even when Hata successfully undermines Chang’s photographs and captions, surely a questionable part of her book, his victories are pyrrhic. Using shadow and uniform analysis, Hata argues that a photo of Imperial soldiers watching the bayoneting of hogtied prisoners in a bomb crater must have taken place somewhere other than Nanjing in winter. Worse, he says, this is the picture upon which the U.S. media seized. His analysis appears unchallenged in English literature, but the photo also supports Hata’s acknowledgment that the ‘Japanese committed many barbarous acts in mainland China.’ There was no shortage of bomb craters.

Hata next examines the photo of a partially naked woman, purportedly taken from the collection of George Fitch, an American serving on the International Safety Zone in Nanjing. Hata doubts the provenance of the photo, saying the man in the picture is wearing a civilian clothing and ‘neither his hat nor his facial expression look very Japanese.’ Yet, Hata concedes that exploitative, sadistic photos were in wide circulation at the time, quoting a ‘high official’ of Japanese field services. A Japanese military policeman was assigned to burn all the lewd photos they found in the mail to Japan, but told the high official that he could ‘help himself to any he wanted.’ This high official describes one photo not dissimilar to the one at issue.

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123 The same photo appears in The Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs, 146-147, where five of the heads are identified by name of the person formerly possession them, said to be residents of ‘Mianhuadi in Nanking.’ The source of that information is also unknown.

124 Hata labels this section ‘telling lies with photographs.’ Nanjing Debate, 131-140. As in Fogel’s world, Chang is not allowed honest mistakes.

125 Nanjing Debate, 132-34.

126 Ibid., 111.

127 Ibid., 134-36.

128 Also Dorn, The Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941, 94 (‘Japanese soldiers took countless photographs of their deeds and sent them back to relatives and friends in their homeland. Developed and printed in Chinese photography shops - the only ones available - many of the prints fell into Chinese and foreign hands and substantiated the outrages perpetuated on a trapped and helpless population.’).
Finally, Hata turns to a ‘more serious misrepresentation’ and reveals his startling discovery regarding the photo of women and children walking under escort, which Chang linked to gang rapes and forced military prostitution.\textsuperscript{129} Doubts as to whether such behavior actually occurred are largely erased as even Japan’s Foreign Ministry now concedes the Army’s exploitation of ‘comfort women’ involved ‘sexual slavery.’\textsuperscript{130} As for this specific photograph, Hata explains that it has a Japanese lineage, first appearing in the November 10, 1937 issue of Japanese newspaper/magazine \textit{Asahi Garafu}. There, just as the Imperial Army was setting off for Nanjing, the Japanese people were regaled with the photo and a tale titled “\textit{Utopia Amidst the Gunpowder},” with Chinese field hands ‘singing as they picked cotton,’ smiling and free from the depredations of Chinese soldiery, ‘their minds at ease as a result of protection provided by our [A]rmy.’ The same photo also appeared in an \textit{Asahi} publication in March 1938, thus neatly bookending the actual events in Nanjing.

The ‘cotton-pickers’ paradise thus appears to be a form of public relations, this one aimed at deluding the Japanese back home. If so, it was a public relations operation that has ended up kicking far harder than it shot.\textsuperscript{131}

Hata then ends \textit{Nanjing Debate} with the dismissive observation that Chang ‘seems to be a second [David] Bergamini.’ Hata is correct in at least one regard. By 2008, when \textit{Nanjing Debate} was published, both Chang and Bergamini were deceased. Thus, those who wrote or were republished in \textit{Nanjing Debate} could do so without any fear that their targets could respond.

\textbf{Alvin Coox and “Waking Old Wounds”}

Alvin Coox was an extraordinary historian. Coox (pronounced ‘Cooks’) was an operations analyst for the US Army and Air Force and later a member of Douglas MacArthur’s Japanese Research Division. He lived in Japan for 14 years where he co-edited \textit{Orient West}, an

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\item \textsuperscript{129} \textit{Nanjing Debate}, 136-140. The photo itself on the 4th page of Chang’s photo section.
\item \textsuperscript{130} See p. 17, footnote 76 above.
\item \textsuperscript{131} It would not be the only Imperial public relations operation to backfire. Another \textit{Nanjing Debate} article addresses the alleged 100-man beheading competition between Japanese soldiers that was promoted in the Japanese press of the day, and which Chang (and many others) have taken at face value. It is described instead ‘… as a tale created by a Japanese journalist and spread by the Japanese military government describing Chinese soldiers killed in battle’ and ‘to inspire Japanese citizens.’ \textit{Nanjing Debate}, 72-73. Elsewhere, the same author says the ‘press placement’ by the military would have vanished with others of similar credibility, but the clever Chinese saw ‘the possibility of propaganda in (the) story and caused it to be preserved.’ Minoru Kitamura, \textit{The Politics of Nanking: An Impartial Investigation} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America 2007), 32.
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English language magazine on Japanese issues and culture. From 1964 to 1995, Coox was Professor of History at San Diego State University. While a Japanophile, truth distorting bias never plagued his work, as exemplified by the book he co-edited with Hilary Conroy, *China and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I*, (Santa Barbara, Ca.: ABC-Clio, Inc, 1978).

Coox was a prolific writer and garnered reviews that would be the envy of any historian. Writing of Coox’ first book, *Year of the Tiger* (Philadelphia: Orient/West, 1964), which features *Nanjing Debate* and is discussed below, Richard Storry said ‘he is invariably accurate, displaying a masterly command of his Japanese sources.’ James Crowley, another respected and oft-quoted historian, opined that ‘*Year of the Tiger* is an extremely well written presentation, distinguished by appealing metaphors, a compelling style and abundant illustrations of the author’s command of the politics, rivalries and nuances of factionalism in the Imperial army.’

Coox’ masterwork was *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), a 1,253 page work described by Mark Peattie as:

‘(t)he finest English-language study written by a single author on modern Asian military history. Indeed, it is arguably a military history classic of any age and any language.’

Coox secured 400 oral history interviews for *Nomonhan* and was said to have interviewed just about every surviving Russian or Japanese veteran of the short but brutal war. The use of oral histories was critical, Coox argued, given calculated destruction of Imperial Army records at war’s end. A Japanese veterans group claims to have ceremonially dedicated an

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132 The ‘best’ of Orient West was published as *The Japanese Image*, eds., Maurice Schneps & Alvin Coox (Tokyo: Orient/West, 1965). Orient West was obviously a sophisticated product, not the work of amateurs or those without an in-depth understanding and appreciation for Japan.


134 *Pacific Affairs* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1965): 178.


138 *The Unfought War*, 2-22.
English copy of Nomonhan in the inner shrine at Yasukuni. The dedication of Nomonhan there undermines assertions that oral histories should be cast aside in pursuit of historical truth, a claim recurring in the comfort women dispute as in criticism of The Rape of Nanking.

Coox’ Japan Echo article “Waking Old Wounds” is his last attributed work, published in Japan Echo after his death following a prolonged illness. As with Fogel’s work, Coox’ article was not originally written for a Japanese audience, suggesting it was specially commissioned for Japan Echo. The article undertakes to assemble a ‘representative selection of myths and mis-statements’ in The Rape of Nanking and to provide a rebuttal to each. Coming from a historian of Coox’ ability and repute, this promises a severe challenge to The Rape of Nanking’s credibility.

It is by no means clear, however, that Coox wrote all or even much of the article. The article is at odds with Coox’ other writings, which refute many key allegations in the Nanjing Debate. The article has a tone alien to Coox’s style. Even the article’s title (“Waking Old Wounds”) with its plea that some history is best left forgotten belies a historian who spent his career unearthing Japanese history, both fair and foul. This was the historian who described remorse over Imperial Japan’s last, grasping act - its calculated destruction of incriminating evidence - thusly:

‘It would have been a heartbreak for me, as a historian, or anyone else interested in this period, to have seen what was happening in Japan after August 15. The sky over Tokyo was black with smoke from documents being burned.’

Another clue is the absence of quotations. Coox habitually allowed the historical characters that he drew forth to speak for themselves. His first book, Year of the Tiger, discussed below, The Unfought War, 17. Coox also collaborated with Saburo Hayashi, a former high ranking member of the Imperial Army’s General Staff, to publish Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corp Association, 1959), a book sharply critical of the Imperial Army's high command. Kogun includes Coox’ superb Biographical Digest on Imperial Army officers and his footnotes, as always, are a goldmine of information.

Professor Coox passed away in San Diego at age 75 in November 1999, following a prolonged illness. San Diego Union-Tribune, Nov. 17, 1999, B-5.


There is a condescending tone toward American readers (88) and stilted language, perhaps representing a work not originally written in English or at least by a Westerner. (91, 95-97). There is also a break in point of view after the first two pages (which speak in first person).

The Unfought War, 15.
is a case in point, with quotations from a wide range of diplomatic, journalistic and military sources of many nationalities. But in “Waking Old Wounds” Chang is not allowed not a single word of her own. And “Waking Old Wounds” never points to a single page where Chang’s ‘myths and misstatements’ appear, leaving the reader to search for it or take it on faith. Coox’ Nomonhan contained 2,226 footnotes taking up 114 pages. Here, there is not one.

These absences are especially telling since many of Chang’s alleged ‘myths and misstatements’ bear little relation to what she actually wrote. A reader will look in vain for those kinds of misrepresentations in Coox’ body of historical work. If there was an undisclosed ghost writer involved, they did neither Iris Chang nor Alvin Coox any favors.

Chang’s first alleged misstatement is said to be her claim that ‘(u)ntil the appearance of the Chang book, no nonfiction publication had ever covered the event at Nanking in substantive detail.’ This is said to be false since Coox treated it in his ‘full length’ book Year of the Tiger. But Chang did not claim that no book had ever mentioned or discussed the Rape of Nanking. Rather, she claimed that there were no books in English ‘exclusively devoted to the massacre’ and that ‘no one had yet written a full-length, narrative nonfiction book on the Rape of Nanking in English.’ Year of the Tiger does not qualify as a ‘full length, narrative fiction book on the Rape of Nanking,’ or one ‘exclusively devoted’ to Nanjing as only six of its 162 pages refer to events there.

What Year of the Tiger says in those pages, however, is striking. Writing that Nanjing had ‘known not peace but only the sword’ prior to March 1938, Coox quotes favorably an American official regarding the ‘absolutely barbarous action of Japanese troops, whose officers made no apparent effort to control them,’ and President Roosevelt’s statement that ‘Japanese soldiers and even the officers are raping Chinese women without limit.’ Coox also reports from neutral eyewitnesses regarding a ‘duplication’ of the Nanjing ‘orgy of looting, raping, drinking and murder’

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144 His review of David Bergamini’s book, which was largely but not completely critical, opened with an actual quote from Bergamini who was quoting in turn a Chinese general. The American Historical Review 77, no. 4 (October 1974): 1169-1170.

145 Nomonhan, 593-661, 1133-1179.

146 Nanjing Debate, 89.

147 Rape of Nanking, 10-11.

148 Year of the Tiger, 18, 74-78. Chang’s statement appears carefully crafted for accuracy, since the book Rape of Nanking: An Undeniable History in Photographs, which predated Chang’s book, includes Chinese and English language descriptions relating to the photograph and events. Chang’s reference to ‘narrative nonfiction book’ seems precisely phrased to distinguish itself from that work.
upon Japan’s capture of Suchow in May 1938.149 Year of the Tiger also notes that the Army’s Minister and Vice-Minister of War were under pressure to resign and make way for peace talks at the time of both the Nanjing and Suchow atrocities, suggesting a link between Army terror and its desire to disrupt diplomacy which it mistrusted and reviled.150 Elsewhere, Coox added that ‘the inflamed Japanese soldiery went berserk in [Nanjing].’151

“Waking Old Wounds” then has Chang alleging that only in her book was it ‘revealed for the first time that Nazi John Rabe, a resident of Nanking, struggled to save the Chinese.’152 This is alleged to be false since Coox’ 1964 book Year of the Tiger disclosed a declassified U.S. State Department record concerning an unnamed Nazi (Rabe) who referred to the Imperial Army’s ‘bestial machinery’ and ‘inhuman activities’ over the six-week period of the city’s ‘martyrdom.’153 But Chang never claimed to be the first to ‘reveal’ Rabe and it would have been absurd for her to do so. John Rabe was not a secret prior to 1964, as the writer of “Waking Old Wounds” seems to think. He was head of the Nanjing International Safety Zone when the Japanese army arrived. Timperley’s 1938 book refers to him and his efforts frequently.154 What Chang instead said was that after Rabe returned to Germany ‘he vanished from all the records, and his whereabouts baffled scholars for decades.’155 Rabe’s subsequent fate (and diary) were what Chang helped unearth. As for the State Department document, it was a significant find by Coox, in line with his skill for unearthing evidence, but not because it was the ‘first’ revelation of Rabe’s efforts as “Waking Old Wounds” asserts.

“Waking Old Wounds” next describes Chang’s claim that ‘300,000 or more civilians were butchered’ and says that ‘is both misleading and inaccurate.’ In spite of its promise to rebut Chang’s ‘myths and misstatements,’ the article undertakes utterly no analysis of numbers and

149 Year of the Tiger, 18, 75.
150 Ibid., 75, 145-146.
151 A Search for Balance, 301-02.
152 Nanjing Debate, 89.
153 The State Department record is discussed at Year of the Tiger, 75.
154 What War Means, 14. A host of Rabe correspondence was reproduced in its Appendix. Another 1939 book, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone, also contained many references to and letters from Rabe. See Brook, Documents on the Rape of Nanking, 4-15, 33-167.
155 Rape of Nanking, 188.
estimates.\textsuperscript{156} Having baited the reader with the numbers issue, the article instantly switches to the faults of the Chinese. Why didn’t they surrender? Why didn’t they withdraw in an orderly manner? That war is chaotic by nature, something Coxx’s entire body of work demonstrates, and that the Imperial Army was doing everything to destroy the cohesion of the Chinese military thereby foiling the desired kow-tow, are not considered, nor is Chang’s own elaboration of Chinese decision-making discussed above.

As with Fogel’s article, “Waking Wounds” ridicules Chang’s claim that Japanese research on Nanjing risks physical threats. Here, at least, the article comes close to describing what Chang actually wrote. But Coxx’s foreword to the book \textit{Kogun} describes ‘a violent controversy’ over a 1955 Japanese article on Unit 731 and an ‘even more violent reaction attended the [1957] publication’ of a book on Japanese atrocities in China, which was withdrawn from circulation and enjoined from republication due to pressure from ‘incensed Rightist elements.’ Oddly, “Waking Old Wounds” itself lends circumstantial support to Chang, referring to the author’s July 1998 computer search in Tokyo (!) that turned up only two Japanese books on Nanjing during the 1950’s and 60’s. Coxx’s lecture on the art of oral history in \textit{The Unfought War} (p. 4) bemoaned the loss of a mere five years in his research, during which time ‘memory decay and actuarial realities’ were eroding his ability to retrieve history. “Waking Old Wounds’ evidences a 20 year void.

“Waking Old Wounds” attacks Chang’s treatment of Japan’s Emperor Hirohito. Perhaps no other allegation better demonstrates the chasm between Chang’s book and the anti-Japanese harpy role drawn of her in \textit{Nanjing Debate}. “Waking Old Wounds” sketches the harpy version, claiming that Chang concluded ‘Hirohito was criminally involved in the Nanking event’ (emphasis added) and unfairly relied on Bergamini. But that is not in Chang’s book. Instead, her discussion (176-80) is objective, balanced, and even deft on the issue of Hirohito’s role, perhaps surprisingly so given her evident outrage that Hirohito and his relative Asaka escaped even the merest questioning for their roles. Rather than making a reflective ‘Hirohito did it,’ however, she writes that it is a controversial subject because of the postwar destruction of Imperial records and that ‘it is practically impossible today to prove whether Emperor Hirohito planned, approved or, or even knew of the atrocities in Nanking.’ She adds that ‘we will probably never know exactly what news Hirohito received about Nanking as the massacre was happening.’

Chang assembles circumstantial evidence of Hirohito’s knowledge and involvement (Nanjing was front page news at the time, Hirohito’s brother later claim to have reported bits and pieces of information to him, Hirohito expressed delight at Nanjing’s capture and later honored the Army commanders), but she is careful not to overstate the conclusiveness of these circumstances. She refers to Herbert Bix, later winner of the Pulitzer Prize for his 2000 biography of

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Year of the Tiger} does not discuss Nanjing casualties, but quantifies stupendous military casualties for China (700,000-800,000) and Japan (250,000 - 400,000) just for 1937 and 1938. Coxx also states that ‘[c]ivilian losses, from various causes, could not be estimated, but it was ‘thought certain that they equal the figure of Army casualties and are probably higher.’ \textit{Ibid.}, 18.
Hirohito, who opined to her that it was ‘inconceivable’ to him that Hirohito could not have known.\textsuperscript{157} But Chang herself does not go so far.

Along the way, she debunks portions of the debate on Hirohito and it is here that she refers to Bergamini’s \textit{The Japanese Imperial Conspiracy}. Rather than playing Bergamini as a trump card for Hirohito’s guilt, as “Waking Old Wounds” asserts, Chang instead regrets that it has only added to the confusion. Writing that Bergamini’s book was ‘[p]erhaps the only English-language book that has attempted to explain Hirohito’s involvement,’ she advises that ‘reputable historians’ claim that ‘he cited sources that did not exist or quoted mysterious unnamed informants who said amazing but unverifiable things’ and, citing Rana Mitter, that ‘no reputable historian of Japan believes that there was a preplanned conspiracy by Japan to conquer the world’ - a central component of Bergamini’s book.\textsuperscript{158} Chang also spends a full page debunking the so-called Tanaka Memorial, a supposed 1927 document outlining Japan’s ambitions for world conquest, which she advises is ‘generally considered by scholars to be a forgery, one with possible Russian origins.’ The harpy version of Chang would have scarcely troubled herself.

For its part, “Waking Old Wounds” tries to establish Hirohito’s innocence with the glib claim that it ‘would not be possible’ for Hirohito to have colluded with his relative Asaka. Why that would be so is unexplained. Instead, “Waking Old Wounds” argues that if the Chinese really believed Hirohito was guilty they would have pursued him. Yet, two sentences later, the article concedes that it was post-war politics that allowed Hirohito avoid Chinese prosecution, a fact also true with respect to the Tokyo Trials.

“Waking Old Wounds”’ most ludicrous moment, however, is its effort to blame Nanjing on a few bad apples. It claims that ‘no evidence was ever uncovered to support allegations of a


\textsuperscript{158} Regarding Bergamini, Chang adds that ‘[i]n all fairness, it must be pointed out that many of the facts in Bergamini’s book are accurate and that he did discover in the course of his research, many important Japanese-language documents for World War II historians. Therefore, scholars have often found Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy to be a valuable—even if flawed and confusing—resource.’ \textit{The Rape of Nanking}, 275. As it turns out, that is exactly Coox himself concluded in his review of Bergamini’s tome. There, Coox writes:

‘…what distresses is that the author did not aspire more modestly. Endowed with energy, imagination, and time, he has collected immense amounts of detail. Presented objectively, without overstatement, they might have convinced us that the emperor was better informed, more industrious, and more influential than believed.’

Japanese policy of terrorism and genocide at Nanking in particular or throughout occupied China in general.’ This flies in the face of orders given to Imperial soldiers ‘to treat all Chinese outside Shanghai as belligerents, kill them and destroy their homes’ and the infamous ‘three-alls’ annihilation policy (kill all, burn all, loot all) later adopted in northern China.\textsuperscript{159}

Instead, “Waking Old Wounds’ blames Nanjing on the ubiquitous Cho Isamu, whose career was ‘replete with insubordinate actions’ and who was said to be responsible for ‘“private” insubordination’ at Nanjing. General Nakajima, of the 16th Division, was an ‘unruly sadist’ who ran off the military police.\textsuperscript{160} Nanking was just a ‘slice of aberrant history.’\textsuperscript{161} “Waking Old Wounds” never explains why an insubordinate troublemaker like Cho turned up exercising the power of life and death at Asaka’s side or why a sadist like Nakajima came to control much of the city. But Coox’ \textit{Year of the Tiger} does - they were part and parcel of the faction of war hawks that dominated the Imperial Army and were primary drivers in launching the war.\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Year of the Tiger} also shows that this group was bitterly opposed to diplomatic peace efforts following in the wake of Nanjing’s capture and Germany’s Trautmann Mediation in particular.\textsuperscript{163} Conveniently

\textsuperscript{159} S.C.M. Paine, \textit{The Wars for Asia 1911-1949} (New York: Cambridge University Press 2012) 137; Bix, \textit{Hirohito}, 333 (‘…the troops (who had been killing prisoners of war throughout the Shanghai fighting) were now ordered to disregard the distinction between combatants and non combatants’). Regarding the so-called ‘three alls’ policy, see \textit{The Japanese Empire}, 129 (‘…the Japanese waged a war of annihilation, including the use of poison gas. Beyond all of the killing, they stripped the countryside of food, causing indescribable civilian misery, while temporarily reducing the population under Communist control from 44 million to 25 million.’).

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Nanjing Debate}, 92. Cho’s career certainly qualified as insubordinate, though his superiors in the Army never seemed to mind much. For example, Cho plotted the October (1931) Incident, which would have involved his leading a ‘47 Ronin-style’ home invasion of the Prime Minister’s residence, there to murder the entire Cabinet. Cho would have become ‘Chief of Police.’ He was punished by a short, paid confinement at a geisha house and his career marched on to Nanjing, where his policing skills failed him. \textit{Year of the Tiger}, 42-45, 83-101, 111-116.

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Nanjing Debate}, 98.

\textsuperscript{162} The Army’s China hawks, whose power was consolidated by the China Incident, were the heirs of earlier Imperial Army factional wars, specifically the so-called ‘Control Faction.’ \textit{Kogun}, 5, 25, 30, 43-57, 64, 144-149. As for Nakajima, then overseer of the Kempeitai, his was the hand flinging open the door to General Ugaki’s car on in January 1937 to warn the Emperor’s choice for Prime Minister that he had been vetoed by the Army. It was a key turning point on the way to war. Nakajima also clashed with Matsui, an Ugaki supporter, over the appointment. Matsui and Nakajima were antagonists to the end, racing to host Nanjing victory parades. \textit{Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity}, 141, 146, 159-160, 182, n. 10.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Year of the Tiger}, 75, 145-46. See also, Hata, \textit{China Quagmire}, 279, 281, 457, n. 102.
for the Army, who nurtured itself on notions that Japanese diplomats had squandered the Army’s past glorious triumphs over China and Russia, the Nanjing terror helped derail the hated diplomacy. Perhaps this is one reason the turmoil at Nanjing lasted so long.

“Waking Old Wounds” ends with a rhetorical question, posted on Wikipedia where it could reawaken the wounds everyday, 24/7, for almost seven years - ‘shouldn’t Chang’s compassion extend to the healing of old wounds rather than their revival’ and with the further wish ‘that Chang’s talents were funneled in the direction of healing rather than retribution,’ not that “Waking Old Wounds” or the rest of Nanjing Debate makes any such an effort.

This ignores how Chang closes her book. For all her evident and unambiguously expressed outrage with Japanese actions at Nanjing and in years since, in the end she rejects the notion that the Japanese are uniquely sinister. Instead, with words taking on added resonance all over the world with each passing day, she writes:

‘I would have to conclude that Japan’s behavior during World War II was less a product of dangerous people than of a dangerous government, in a vulnerable culture, in dangerous times, able to sell dangerous rationalizations to those whose human instincts told them otherwise … sheer concentration of power in government is lethal - that only a sense of absolute unchecked power can make atrocities like the Rape of Nanking possible.’


While there is little agreement on numbers killed, there is a rough consensus, save for the illusionists, that the worst of Nanjing’s agony lasted six weeks. Hata, as noted, uses this period, which overlapped the struggles and final failure of the Trautmann Mediation.


The Rape of Nanking, 220. Or, as she put it in her Introduction ‘[i]t is about the power of cultural forces either to make devils of us all, to strip away that thin veneer of social restraint that makes humans humane, or to reinforce it.’. Ibid., 13.
Conclusion

Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking* was a subversive work and not just of the world’s accepted ignorance of Nanjing. It was subversive of the world of ‘Academe’ as well. Any established English-language historian could have undertaken the same massive archival research and written their own versions of Nanjing. Instead, the field was left to Iris Chang. Young, female and from the ‘wrong side’ of the academic tracks (journalism), Chang’s example suggested that outsiders might research and explain history more powerfully and successfully than the experts. Chang herself spoke of the ‘Power of One’ person to make an enormous difference in the world and to ‘subvert an entire power structure.’

Chang’s worldwide impact and book sales grates on the writers in *Japan Echo*. Fogel complains that Chang is ‘just a journalist’ (emphasis in Fogel), which explain for him her ‘ignorance of so much of the writing about the very topic of her book.’ He deplores that ‘our impact on the general public will never approach Chang’s’ and that ‘her book has already sold hundreds of thousands of copies.’ The book sales and impact also weighs on Hata. Yet, any argument that they were only concerned that a false view of Nanjing was thereby propagated is rendered hollow by the badly skewed inaccuracies in their *Japan Echo* writings. Precisely because of their respected professional reputations, these flawed writings may have had an outsized impact on Chang’s and *The Rape of Nanking*’s reputation within ‘the Academy’ and the world at large.

Academicians should be as free as anyone to take sides and write out of a sense of anger, but there is an enormous difference here. The fact that Chang wrote out of outrage and passion was open and obvious - it pulses from every page and Chang herself advertised it. She allows her readers to see where she is coming from and thereby maintain their bearings in this sea of controversy. Iris Chang’s work was not hidden behind a facade of academic dignity nor the false advertising of ‘modern, scientific standards’ of historiography as in *Nanjing Debate*.

Another difference is that on key issues Chang did allow venom to overwhelm her objectivity in *The Rape of Nanking*. This is shown most crisply shown in Chang’s treatment of Asaka and Hirohito, who might have been expected to play the role of arch villains in her narrative.

In contrast, venom reigns triumphant in *Nanjing Debate*. *The Rape of Nanking* offers an objective critic much to say: there are issues concerning death numbers and some photographs, reasonable people may differ with Chang’s prescriptions for a cure (apologies, reparations), and there are factual errors, if the critic were to stick to the actual errors or those that amount to

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169 *Nanjing Debate*, 18, 128.
170 *The Woman Who Could Not Forget*, 300 (‘It was this sense of moral responsibility - and moral outrage - that goaded me to write my second book, *The Rape of Nanking*.’)
much. But that was not enough. Perhaps sensing that a truly objective approach would leave the honor and trustworthiness of *The Rape of Nanking* intact, the writers in *Japan Echo* instead adopted a sort of ‘Chang delenda est’ - Chang must be destroyed - whereby they sought completely to discredit the book and Chang’s credibility. A fictionalized, wholly negative ‘public relations’ version of Iris Chang and *The Rape of Nanking* was the result, a shocking result issuing from the pens of some of the finest professional historians in the world.

David Askew too throws off the cloak of objective and scientific historiography when he gets to Chang, succumbing to the urge for overkill. Sounding Fogelian, he claims Chang’s book ‘cannot be called [a] proper investigation that [relies] on primary sources,’ and ‘lack[s] real evidence for her claims,’ even though *The Rape of Nanking* contains page after page quoting the writings and testimony of those who were there. Askew charges works like Chang’s are ‘unlikely to feature any strict adherence to standards of proof for their claims.’ (emphasis added). Not any? Askew says Iris Chang is ‘loose, sloppy’ in her methodology. Elsewhere, he says the book ‘can only be described as frequently fraudulent and/or fictitious,’ though he offered not one example.¹⁷¹ (emphasis added).

It may be fairly argued that the foregoing duel is just part of the ‘Fight Club’ of historiography. Historians compete amongst themselves and their disputes may not follow ‘Marquis of Queensbury’ type rules. But here Japan’s Foreign Ministry placed an hand on the scales of the debate. *Japan Echo* selected shrill weapons from shrill combatants which the Foreign Ministry then distributed to English language opinion makers. The many alternative Japanese viewpoints were suppressed, even though ‘strengthening (Japan’s) international public relations in a balanced manner’ was one of the Foreign Ministry’s standards governing *Japan Echo*. That the existence of these ‘off-stage’ Japanese scholars are advanced in *Japan Echo* as proof of Chang’s callousness recalls Rochefoucauld’s statement that ‘hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue.’

The Foreign Ministry’s intervening hand was also shrouded in the shadows. Had the Foreign Ministry’s connection been disclosed where it matter most - the pages of *Nanjing Debate* and the three issues of *Japan Echo* - it would have instantly alerted readers to potential bias and brought into closer focus the ‘big gap’ between the promise and the product. Instead, both the reader and Chang are the subject of a form of sneak attack.

Finally, like the Imperial Japanese public relations operations discussed above, the concealment of the Foreign Ministry’s role is counterproductive. For it calls into question the sincerity of Japan’s postwar apologies and even its treaty commitment to war crimes verdicts by creating at least the appearance that Japan’s government is keeping its fingers crossed behind its back.

That public relations and its black sheep relative propaganda are wartime weapons is scarcely news, but *Nanjing Debate*, culminating a decade of *Japan Echo* articles, was a 70th Anniversary present to the English language world. Though the fighting has ended, the ‘China Incident’ seems to stagger on through efforts like those in *Japan Echo* and *Nanjing Debate*. In this, it echoes Professor Alvin Coox’ final words in *Year of the Tiger*, named for the Chinese New Year beginning just as Nanjing was finally winding down:

‘Through the gorges of the Yangtze, then, one million Japanese troops slogged westward with their guns and packhorses, while the phantom of total victory continued to elude their aching grasp in this, the year of the astrological Tiger.’\footnote{Year of the Tiger, 159.}
Appendix: Hata’s ‘Errata’ List

The notion that Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking* abounds with factual error is constant in *Nanjing Debate*. If true, it should be easy for skilled historians to find them, especially when they had a full decade to do so. Hata Ikuhiko produces a Table of ‘Errata from Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking*’ at page 127 of *Nanjing Debate*. Professor Fogel endorses this list (‘…virtually all his (Hata’s) points are well taken.’).

A ‘grading’ of Hata’s list follows. Since this is Hata’s list, he shall bear the burden of proof. ‘Material error’ as used here means an error important enough that it could influence the reader in contrast to the trivial or relatively unimportant. Material errors in turn may be subdivided into those that, when corrected, actually make Chang’s arguments stronger or at least do not detract therefrom vs. fundamental error, whose significance may be considered to destroy the validity of *The Rape of Nanking*.

Errata 1 (Cho Isamu’s name at p. 40). Discussed above, Chang’s error is immaterial. Score: Hata 0 for 1.

Errata 2 (a cousin of the Empress was killed at p. 33). Chang gives no authority for this, but neither does Hata, who merely says ‘[n]o such fact.’ Both historians reduce the reader to ‘faith based’ history here and Hata’s own errors in *Nanjing Debate* show his glib assurance cannot be taken for granted. If the issue is material, it is not by much. No error proven. Score: Hata 0 for 2.

Errata 3 (Nakajima was chief of the ‘Japanese secret police’ prior Nanjing p. 37). Hata says he was head of the ‘military police.’ In fact, he appears to have been the Provost Marshal General, whose authority included the Kempetai, though this is perhaps another trivial matter of officer titles. Charles D.Pettibone, *The Organization and Order of Battle of Militaries of World War II, vol. IV - Japan* (Rochester, NY: Trafford Publishing 2007), 40-41. Regarding ‘military police,’ Hata may be technically accurate, but is fundamentally misleading. The Kempetai had a fearsome Gestapo-like reputation. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, 72-73, 89. A review of the Kempetai’s activities is found in Raymond Lamont-Brown, *Kempetai: Japan’s Dreaded Military Police* (Stroud, England: Sutton, 1998). Chang herself breaks any tie on terminology by her later reference to the ‘secret...military police.’ *The Rape of Nanking*, 203. Score: Hata 0 for 3.

Errata 4 (General Tani Hisao was found guilty of raping 20 women p. 50). Chang cites a contemporaneous China newspaper, as well as Chinese language copy of the Nanjing trial verdict. Hata writes there is no mention of this in the Chinese indictment and verdict. Neither the indictment nor verdict in English has been located. Tani comes across as an estimable character in English writings, including being something of a historian. *Nanking: Anatomy of an Atrocity*, 93. He also suffered at trial from the absence of a likely truer villain, Nakajima, who was dead. *Ibid.*, 194-195. Chang herself rivetingly describes the passions surrounding his trial. Count a
material error against Chang regarding Tani Hisao’s alleged rapes, but on the basis of very subjective grounds. Score: Hata 1 of 4.

Errata 5 (a Japanese doctor Nagatomi Hakudo confessed his crimes p. 59). Hata says Chang got his given name wrong, that he is now an acupuncturist and that he visited Nanking in early 1938 as a visiting junior college student. He offers no support for any of this. Chang, however, cites a February 10, 1992 New Republic article by Joanna Pitman, Tokyo correspondent of the Times of London, who interviewed Nagatomi. Pitman lists his given name as ‘Hakudo’ and described him as ‘a doctor.’ Pitman states he arrived in Nanking in December 1937 and he is quoted as being there in 1937. Pitman also puts meat on Hata’s barebones vision of a vacationing student by noting that that his school, Kokushikan Junior College, was ‘a well known breeding ground for nationalists,’ and that he went to Nanking as a ‘promising right wing student.’ Takashi Yoshida’s 2006 book confirms that Pitman got his given name wrong (p. 232, n.25), but that is scarcely material. Score: Hata 1 of 5.

Errata 6 (the Hirota memo re: 300,000 p. 103). As discussed above, while Chang correctly described the nature of the Hirota memo in a subsequent footnote, her main text overstated ‘notice’ to ‘believed.’ Score: Hata 2 of 6.

Errata 7 (Ohta’s confession re: burials p. 101). Chang cites a 1990 Reuters’ dispatch for this. Hata says the confession was ‘forced’ and Ohta didn’t show up in Nanjing until December 25. He offers no proof for this. Chang herself offers the possibility that Ohta may be lying, thus at least the alerting to the reader. Score: Hata 2 of 7.

Errata 8 (Japan has cram elementary schools to get into the right high school p. 205). Hata only says her ‘meaning is unclear.’ The existence of expensive private ‘cram’ schools does not seem to be a secret. It is either no error by Chang or at least an immaterial one. Score: 2 of 8.

Errata 9 (Education Ministry textbook screeners ordered elimination of all references to the numbers of Chinese killed because of insufficient evidence p. 208). Hata says that six of seven ‘currently approved’ middle-school textbooks use figures from ‘150,000 to 300,000,’ but he is writing in 1998. Hata fails to mention that Chang’s reference was to a 1991 directive. He offers no proof that her 1991 reference was invalid (though she offers no proof either). As for the later textbooks, Hata may be referring to Takashi Yoshida who spoke of junior high texts in 1997. Yoshida noted that ‘[a]uthors discovered that, if they mentioned the figure but did not necessarily

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175 The Making of the ‘Rape of Nanking, 139-140.
endorse it, the government would not withhold authorization’ and that a ‘common practice was to relegate the Chinese estimate to a footnote…’ Hata proves no material error and may be less than forthcoming with his conflation of dates. Score: Hata 2 of 9.

Errata 10 (official denials of wartime atrocities p. 224). Hata rewrites what Chang actually said by inserting a bracket that has her referring to alleged denials “[by the Japanese Government].” Thus fortified, Hata then argues the ‘Japanese government has never denied the atrocities in Nanking and other places’ and it accepted the judgment of the Tokyo war crimes trial in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. The ‘official denials’ to which Chang refers are those of five cabinet level ministers or officials which she outlines at 202-205. She also describes the rebukes suffered by these officials, concluding how they arouse ‘shame and embarrassment’ on the part of some Japanese. The author of “Waking Old Wounds” confirms Chang, noting that ‘high-ranking and generally elderly official(s) of the Japanese government’ have been quoted denying Nanjing and that such denials now bring castigation. Score: Hata 2 of 10.

Errata 11 (Japan’s government needs to issue an official apology for Nanking p. 225). Hata says there have been apologies from the Emperor on down, although it is not clear that any of them specifically mention Nanjing. See “A (very) short history of Japan’s war apologies,” Washington Post, August 13, 2015. More critically, this was Chang’s opinion about what should be done. Reasonable people such as Hata may have a different opinion, but that does not make hers an error of fact. Score: Hata 2 of 11.

Errata 12 (number count on death and rapes pp. 4, 6, 102). As discussed Hata does not attempt to show any factual errors by Chang on the matter of rapes. Count one-half no error proven by Hata. Chang overstates the IMTFE findings from 200,000 to 260,000 and the nature of the Timperley memo. Count one-half material error against Chang. Score: Hata 2.5 out of 12.

Errata 13 (Eleven photos): As shown above, Hata does not prove, at least in his English language work, the validity of his claim that all eleven ‘sadism and sex crimes’ photos are ‘fakes, forgeries or composites.’ Nonetheless, he shows the relationship between some of those photos and Chang’s use of them is a major issue. Score: Hata 3.5 out of 13.

A final score of 27% would not pass many history tests. Yet, it is from works like Hata’s that much of The Rape of Nanking’s reputation for error flows. Perhaps a reconsideration is in order, instead of the ‘emotional and facile’ game of discounting the entirety of The Rape of Nanking because it was not perfect.

176 Nanjing Debate, 97 (Cox).

Author’s Disclosures

I am not a professional historian nor an academician. My training was in legal studies and I was a Texas trial lawyer. In my defense, I note that Professor David Askew, authority on the standards of historical objectivity, does not appear to be a Professor of History. He is a Professor of Legal Studies, as disclosed elsewhere.  

I also have no fluency in the Japanese or Chinese languages. However, Japan Echo was precisely aimed at the English-language world. On the theory that targets of the Foreign Ministry’s public relations operation are entitled to their own ‘say’ in response, this has been mine.

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178 Complicating the Picture, back cover.